One of the key components of any school choice system is the information given to parents as the basis for choice. We develop and implement a framework for determining the optimal performance metrics to help parents choose a school. This approach combines the three major critiques of the usefulness of performance tables into a natural, implementable metric. The best content for school performance tables is the statistic that best answers the question: "In which feasible choice school will a particular child achieve the highest exam score?" We implement this approach for 500,000 students in England for a range of performance measures. Using performance tables is strongly better than choosing at random: a child who attends the highest ex ante performing school within their choice set will ex post do better than the average outcome in their choice set twice as often as they will do worse.
Introduction
One of the key components of any school choice system is the information given to parents as the basis for choice. For example, using both a field experiment and a natural experiment, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that the provision of information on school performance changed the school choice decisions of disadvantaged families towards highperforming schools. The publication of performance information is well established in some countries: performance tables showing each school's proportion of pupils gaining five or more good grades have been published nationally in England since 1992 1 ; in the US, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 mandated publication of school-specific performance measures as part of a broad drive to greater school accountability. There is evidence that such information is used by parents, for example Koning and van der Wiel (2010) for the Netherlands and Coldron et al. (2008) and Burgess et al. (2010) for England. Given the use and the impact of this information, it is clearly important to get it right: parents should be given performance data that is both comprehensible, 2 meaning it is given to them in a metric that they can interpret, and functional, meaning it is a useful predictor of their own child's likely exam performance. This paper focuses on the latter. Although NCLB and other school choice policies rely on the assumption that it makes sense for parents to choose schools based on lists of schools' test scores, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) comment "the relationship between school average test scores and student achievement has not been strongly established." (p. 1378). We develop and implement a framework for determining the optimal performance metrics to help parents choose the school where their child is most likely to succeed academically. We apply this framework to a range of performance measures to decide which metrics, if any, should be given to parents to inform school choice. The longevity of performance tables plus the seven years of universe pupil data now available in England allow us to systematically address this question for the first time.
There is some scepticism that school performance tables are useful in choosing a school and several lines of critique have been presented by researchers. First, it is argued that simple tabulations of raw exam performance (such as graduation rates or average student test 1 Since then increasingly sophisticated value-added or progress measures have supplemented the raw metrics.
Value-added metrics were first piloted in 1998 and introduced nationally the subsequent year; contextual valueadded pilots were first published in 2005; and expected progress measures were first reported in 2009. 2 We address issues of comprehensibility in a separate paper .
3 scores) largely reflect differences in school composition; they do not reflect teaching quality and so are not informative about how one particular child might do at a school. For example, a school with a high average exam score might simply attract high ability pupils and there would therefore be no reason to expect any given student to attain a high exam score there. Kane and Staiger (2002) make this point in the context of performance tables as an accountability measure. Second, schools might be differentially effective such that even measures of average teaching quality or test score gains may be misleading for students at either end of the ability distribution. Different school practices and resources might be more important for gifted students or others for low ability students, and these important differences are lost in a single average measure. Indeed, several studies have shown that in any particular year there is a difference in the estimated school effect at different parts of the ability distribution, though differences are not consistently found across other dimensions such as gender or ethnicity (Jesson and Gray, 1991; Sammons et al., 1993; Thomas et al., 1997; Wilson and Piebalga 2008) . Third, it is argued that the scores reported in performance tables are so variable over time that they cannot be reliably used to predict a student's future performance. The problem of instability in performance measures was highlighted by Kane and Staiger (2002) in relation to the performance-triggered sanctions in NCLB; they cite sampling variation and real but transient variation and small sample (school) sizes as the main reasons for the volatility. Leckie and Goldstein (2009) re-emphasise this in the context of school league tables in England, arguing that the six year gap in time between school choice and exam outcome makes choice using value-added league tables valueless.
There is also a separate large literature that critiques the role of school performance information in the framework of school accountability 3 .
We combine these three critiques into a single question, which we use to evaluate performance tables as a basis for school choice. This provides a natural metric for judging the quantitative importance of all these critiques. The question that parents want answered is: "In which feasible choice school will my child achieve the highest exam score?". We argue that the best content for school performance tables is the statistic that best answers 3 Performance tables are seen as part of a performance management system that has implicit or explicit incentives attached to performance outcomes (Propper and Wilson, 2003) . It is argued that certain performance measures can lead to dysfunctional behaviour such as manipulating admissions (see for example, Figlio and Getzler (2006) and Cullen and Reback (2006) for the US, West and Pennell (2000) and West (2010) for England) and excessive teaching to the test (for example, Wiggins and Tymms (2002) for England, Deere and Strayer (2001) and Jacob (2005) for the US). 4 this question. Furthermore, if no performance measure can provide better guidance than choosing a school at random, then we would conclude that performance tables in this context are valueless. We address this using 6 years of universal pupil census data and adopting a two part empirical strategy. We identify a feasible choice set of schools for each student, and define a set of school choice decision rules based on different information sets (school performance tables). These allow us to identify the school that each pupil would have chosen under each decision rule. We then estimate the counterfactuals: how would that particular pupil have scored if they had attended that school for the following five years. Finally, a comparison of that outcome with a choice at random from the feasible choice set -that is, a choice uninformed by performance tables -tells us whether using that decision rule was successful for that student. We analyse this comparison across decision rules and across student types and areas.
We implement this approach for half a million students in England, making a school choice decision in 2003 for school entry in 2004, and taking their final exams in 2009. We find that using (some) performance tables is strongly better than choosing at random: a child who attends the highest performing school within their choice set on 2003 data will ex post do better than the average out-turn in their choice set twice as often as they will do worse than average. We demonstrate two surprising results: first, raw outcome performance tables outperform sophisticated conditional outcome tables. This result derives mainly from the low temporal stability in the conditional outcome rankings. Second, we show that differential performance tables (defined below) do no better in picking the best school than do average performance tables. We speculate that both of these results depend in turn on the importance of school composition in influencing school resources and teaching quality.
We also show that performance tables are least useful to students with small choice sets, and to lower ability and disadvantaged students, though no worse than choosing at random.
The key statistical issue in the paper arises from the difficulty of estimating true school effects in a context where students are not randomly assigned to schools. The interpretation of estimated school effects as true school effectiveness is obviously an issue facing all papers in this field, and there is no additional problem in our approach. We discuss the possible biases for our results in Section 2.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out our modelling framework including the estimation approach for predicting pupil attainment. Section 3 describes the data, and section 4 presents the results and our robustness checks. Finally, section 5 discusses the implications of the results for the appropriate content for school performance tables, and for school choice.
Modelling framework
We first set out our model of the production of pupil attainment and school actions. We then describe the school choice decision rules and the approach to estimating counterfactual outcomes for pupil attainment.
a. The production of pupil attainment
We adopt a fairly standard education production function, although we allow for a more flexible form with fewer specification assumptions (Todd and Wolpin, 2003 
where X i denotes the pupil's own characteristics that determine achievement that we observe in our dataset such as prior attainment, poverty status, gender and so on. Clearly, there are other factors influencing attainment that are not observable in standard administrative datasets, such as parental education, and the child's motivation. denotes the characteristics of i's peers, the 'pure' peer effect, excluding the component mediated by school practices which we explicitly consider below. The school effect is μ s , which is not restricted to a simple linear additive effect on top of pupil characteristics. It is useful to consider explicitly where this school effect comes from, and we assume it derives from a set of general school practices, Z s , as follows: the quality of teaching and non-teaching staff (q s ); the quality of leadership practices (l s ) such as leadership style, policies towards behaviour, the strength of governance, and the monitoring of teachers; the amount and quality of school resources (r s ); and the school mission or ethos (e s ).
b. The production of school resources
One of the key insights of an economic analysis of schools is that the quality of school resources and practices derives from the choices of agents -headteachers, governors, teachers and local government. Governors appoint headteachers and take a more or less proactive role in school governance; heads accept or reject job offers in particular schools, they appoint teachers, and provide more or less inspirational and effective leadership; teachers also accept or reject job offers in particular schools, and help to generate effective teaching resources in a school. These different decisions will depend on the objectives of the actors and their constraints. A complete model of the outcome of this is beyond the scope of this paper, but the key point is that the decisions will almost certainly react to the environment that the actors are in. This matters because it makes it clear that the degree of persistence we observe in the data on school quality is behavioural, not an exogenous statistical process. It will in general depend on the situation a school is in, the degree of competition and so on. We will return to this analysis in the light of our results below.
We assume a simple reduced form representation of those reactions. For example, although teachers clearly have heterogeneous preferences for school types, we assume that long-run teacher quality depends on the school's typical or expected composition, , 4 recent past school exam performance, denoted , leadership, resources and ethos, and the area the school is in:
We include the area as it captures the effect of the teacher labour market, financial resourcing and the political control of the LA. These factors are clear influences on the likelihood of teachers of different quality being offered and accepting a job at a particular school. Similarly, we assume that the other school practices are determined in the same way:
4 It is hard to observe whether deprived schools in England actually do have lower quality teachers because quality is hard to estimate directly. However, several research findings suggest they have higher teacher turnover and difficulties in recruitment and retention more generally (Smithers and Robinson, 2005; Dolton and Newsom, 2003) .
where Z s-denotes the other three Z variables. Noting the dependence of past exam performance on past school composition and past school quality, the long run solution to this will be of the form:
That is, schools have a long-run tendency for the quality of school practices to be strongly influenced by the peer and social context of the school. Any deviations from this are likely to be transitory.
Of course, the reverse dynamic is also taking place, and the school's quality and resources will probably attract particular sorts of students. We return to this point below when we discuss selection bias into schools.
c. School choice decision rules
We assume that each student i faces a set c i of schools that can be chosen from. We set out the empirical implementation of this below. In each potential school σ at the school choice date t, the distribution of exam outcomes has density function φ(y) σt . Each school choice decision rule is a decision to choose the highest-performing school based on a particular statistic of this distribution, denoted h(φ(y) σt ). The aim of this paper is to compare the implications of different decision rules, that is, the use of different performance statistics.
Below we consider three main types of performance information: the fraction of students passing at least 5 exams (a threshold variable, a raw outcome measure); the average exam score of the students in the school (a continuous variable, a raw outcome measure); and a regression-based conditional (or contextual) value-added measure (a continuous, conditional measure). The first and third of these are the main published measures in England. We also consider: the average exam score differentiated for groups of students based on prior ability to introduce a very simple element of conditionality 5 ; a straightforward measure of school ability composition; and performance in maths only, and English only.
Separately for each decision rule h and for each student i we identify the highest-performing school in the choice set based on information available at the time of decision:
d. Estimating school outcomes
We need to predict the exam score outcome for each school in the choice set of each student. These are counter-factuals: all bar one of these will therefore be estimated values for schools that that student did not actually attend (and we actually use an estimate of attainment for the student's own school). We use (1) as our starting point and to implement it most flexibly we estimate separate regressions for each school, and include all the interactions of individual characteristics we observe (see below). This allows school practices and resources to affect the impact of, say, prior ability on the final exam test score. The peer effect and the common impact of school resources are estimated in the constant term in each school regression.
Having estimated the 3143 school-by-school regressions (not reported but summarised in Appendix Table 2 ) we use them to predict exam outcomes. We restrict the schools that we predict for as follows: we produce an estimated outcome only for schools in each student's choice set; and we only produce estimated outcomes for schools with a minimum number of students similar to the focus student (detailed below). These criteria mean that we are not predicting too far out of sample -only for schools local to the focus student, and which already have students similar to the focus student. We interpret this quite conservatively to avoid producing estimated outcomes for contexts (schools) totally alien to the focus student, and which would therefore be very biased.
There are two main issues with our estimation procedure and we consider first a comparison of our approach with a matching approach. Our school-by-school regression approach with (almost) all interactions of the student variables in fact gets close to mimicking a matching approach in allowing for very heterogeneous effects. It is important to recognise that matching on observables is no better at dealing with the core statistical issue 8 9 (the non-random assignment of students to schools) than regression; we return to this below. Exact matching on observables would find observationally-equivalent students. The method would be to identify such students in other schools in the choice set and take the mean outcome for that group in that school as the predicted outcome for the focus student.
Even with as much data as we have available, using all the variables at our disposal, exact matching will produce a lot of empty cells and therefore a lot of null predictions. The tradeoff would be to use fewer variables to generate more predictions but at the cost of more uncontrolled heterogeneity. An alternative would be to use propensity score matching to introduce some smoothness and to include students who were somewhat alike to the focus student without restricting to exact matches. In practical terms this means running a matching model to identify students alike to the focus student, which implies a regression with a dependent variable equal to 1 for just one observation (the focus student). This regression would be run for each of half a million students to generate the matched set for each focus student. It seems highly likely that this procedure would be very noisy and unreliable. Given these issues, we adopt the school-by-school regression approach.
The second issue is the potential effects of school selection bias. Students are not randomly assigned to schools and there are unobserved student characteristics that influence both the probability of assignment and subsequent exam performance. We cannot model the assignment process explicitly and so, absent any instrument for school assignment (such as that used by Sacedote, 2010), we will have biased estimates of school effects. Essentially, we will overestimate the quality of schools with unobservably good pupils. This means that we will impute higher scores to the counterfactual pupils not at that school than they would truly have achieved had they attended. This is a well-known problem and it faces all attempts to estimate true school effects; it is not an additional problem for our approach.
We take two practical steps to minimise the bias. First, we use as many observable student characteristics as possible, including measures of student progress between ages 7 and 11 in some specifications to capture differences in progress from age 11 to 16. All of these are interacted with other individual characteristics, again allowing for a varying impact schoolby-school. Descriptors for very small neighbourhood are also helpful in refining the characterisation of the student's famiy background. Second, we only consider counterfactual pupils for plausible local schools, and do not retain predictions for schools with no similar students to the focus student.
We can make statements about the nature of the bias if we are prepared to explicitly parameterise the assignment process. Suppose we assume that the assignment mechanism s is: allocating student i to school , ;
where ε represents unobserved student characteristics. If a() is such that ε and μ are uncorrelated, then we have no problem. The case for concern is that a() implies that high ε students get into high μ schools, leading us to overestimate the effectiveness of those schools. However, while this simple assignment process will lead to biased estimates of the school effects -and hence of predicted student outcomes -there are important cases when it will not change the rank ordering of schools. Hence if the biased outcome prediction for student i for school σ * exceeds the average in c i , we can infer that the unbiased prediction would too.
W illustrate this as (7) e follows. Assume a simplified attainment function:
where X is an observable student characteristic, ε an unobservable student characteristic with density function θ( ), μ s the true school effect and ω is testing noise. For concreteness,
we can think of ε as household income.
We assume a very simple school assignment mechanism as follows. Demand for school places is increasing in μ s . The greater the demand, the more oversubscribed is the school and hence the closer to the school a family needs to live to win a place under the pervasive proximity condition. This is more expensive given the equilibrium in the schooling and housing markets, and so the greater the income required. This simple model can be represented as: if , where p() is a monotonically increasing function 6 .
Given this selection, if we estimate (7) by OLS the estimated constant will be:
.
In general, with a sufficiently regular density function θ( ), k() is a monotonically increasing function. In this case, the ordering of estimated school effects is the same as the ordering of true school effects, that is implies . Given the simple attainment function given by (7), it also then follows that if the condition E E | is true for the estimated the estimated school effects, it will also hold for the true school effects.
There are obviously important cases when this straightforward result will not hold.
Significant variation in the parameters of (6) can be a problem. The school assignment process in England, which (6) summarises, is complex and varied, involving parental preferences and local authority rules for tie-breaking at over-subscribed schools, plus other schools that administer their own admissions (see the next section, and also West et al., 2009 ). The case where the parameters of (6) are the same within the local area for each student again presents no problem. However, there is little we can do if the parameters of (6), and the consequential correlation between ε and μ, vary significantly between schools within a local area. Secondly, if there are quantitatively important differences in the γ parameter in (7) between schools, then although the result on the estimated school constants will still hold, it is no longer true that this carries over automatically to the comparison of the predicted value in the best school and the choice set mean. But we emphasise, however, that this is problematic for all attempts to interpret school effects, and therefore for all analyses of school performance data.
e. Assessing the performance of decision rules
We have a feasble choice set of schools c i , an estimated outcome for each school in that set , and a decision rule selecting one school as the highest performing according to a particular performance statistic, ℎ . The final stage of our approach is to assess the success of alternative decision rules in making good choices for students. The main question we ask is whether
( 9) that is, whether the student's predicted exam performance at the ex ante 'best' school is better than the student's average ex post exam performance across all schools in their choice set. The latter is the expected value of choosing in an uninformed way, choosing at random. The metrics for choosing at random are reported in Appendix Table 3 , but we 12 favour the mean outcome across the choice set because it is more straightforward to interpret the odds ratio for small choice set sizes.
We report other metrics, including whether a 'good' school chosen at random from the top half of the child's choice set is better than the student's average exam performance and whether a child would do worse than the average outcome in their choice set if they selected the school with the lowest performance on the decision rule. We report for how many students this is true, and for which students.
Data on English secondary schools
Compulsory education in England lasts for 11 years, covering the primary (age 5 to 11) and secondary stages (age 11 to 16). Most pupils transfer from primary to secondary school at age 11, although there are a few areas where this transfer is slightly different due to the presence of middle schools. Secondary school allocation takes place via a system of constrained choice whereby parents are able to express ordered preferences for three to six Parents can choose a school in one of two ways: they can choose from within a local 'feasible' choice set of schools that it is possible to reach and who would accept them or they can choose to move house next to a desirable school. The latter phenomenon, known as 'selection by mortgage' is widely believed to be common in England, but recent research suggests that the extent to which the middle classes move house to gain advantages in school choice may be overstated . Not all local schools will accept all local children. Admissions policies are complex in England, but they generally work as follows.
First priority is usually given to pupils with a sibling already at the school, pupils with statements of special educational needs and children in public care. Next, the largest proportion of places is allocated giving priority to children living within a designated area or on the basis of proximity to school. There are also significant numbers of schools who do not give priority to local communities: at voluntary-aided religious schools (17 percent of 13 secondary pupils), priority is usually given on the basis of religious affiliation or adherence; other state schools offer a proportion of places on the basis of ability or aptitude for a particular subject (including 164 entirely selective grammars schools). Within this very complex system it is estimated that around half of all pupils will not attend their nearest school, although this may not have been their preferred choice (Allen, 2007; Burgess et al., 2006 ).
a. The National Pupil Database (NPD)
In this analysis we draw pupil-level data from all eight years (2002 to 2009) of the National Pupil Database (NPD) to measure school performance in a variety of ways, described below.
NPD is an administrative dataset of all pupils in the state-maintained system, providing an annual census of pupils taken each year in January, from 2002 onwards (with termly collections since 2006). This census of personal characteristics can be linked to each pupil's test score history. We use a single cohort to analyse the potential consequences of the secondary school choices made by over 500,000 pupils who transferred to secondary school in September 2004, completing compulsory education in 2009. These pupils are located in 3143 secondary schools; we exclude non-standard schools such as special schools or those with fewer than 30 pupils in a cohort from the analysis. We drop a small number of pupils from our analysis because they appear to be in the incorrect year group for their age or they have a non-standard schooling career history.
NPD provides data on gender (female), within-year age (month), ethnicity (asian, black, othereth) , an indicator of whether English is spoken at home (eal) and three indicators of Special Educational Needs (senstat, senplus, senact, measuring learning or behavioural difficulties at a high, medium and low level, respectively). It also provides us with two measures of the socio-economic background of the child. Free School Meals (fsm) eligibility is an indicator of family poverty that is dependent on receipt of state welfare benefits (such as Income Support or Unemployment Benefit). Our FSM variable is a very good measure of the FSM status of the 12 per cent of our cohort who have it, but it has been shown by Hobbs and Vignoles (2009) to be a crude measure of household income or poverty status. We also use the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (idaci), an indicator for the level of deprivation of the household's postcode. 7 Data on individual pupil characteristics are linked to educational attainment at the ages of 7 (Key Stage 1 -KS1), 11 (KS2) and 16 (GCSE or equivalent examinations). The linked test score data that measures the academic attainment of children in KS2 tests at the end of primary school serves as a useful proxy for academic success to date. We use an overall score (KS2) that aggregates across all tests in English, maths and science, as well as the individual subject scores in our regressions (KS2eng, KS2mat, KS2sci). We also utilise the KS1 data recorded by teachers on children at age 7 in some specifications reported in Appendix Table 5 . There are some concerns about the consistency of these data because a component of KS1 is teacher assessed, but we believe the data quality is adequate for our purposes. Summary statistics of our data are presented in Appendix Table 1 .
b. Defining the choice set
Our research question analyses the extent to which school performance tables can be used to make good school choices from within a local choice set. Clearly it is impossible for us to know which schools any particular parent is actively considering for their child because this will be a function of their own preferences and constraints and the admissions policies of the school. Instead, we define a choice set for every pupil that will complete school in 
c. Calculating decision rules
We use information on the 2003 school performance that would be available to parents whose children start secondary school in September 2004. These are the decision rules that we use to establish whether school performance data can help parents make school choices that maximise their own child's likely exam performance from within a choice set of schools.
The decision rules that we test include metrics that have been published by the government and new rules that we have constructed from the underlying pupil-level data from the cohort who were age 16 in 2003. Pupils typically take nationally set, high stakes, GCSE or equivalent examinations in 8 to 10 subjects at the age of 16 and these are measured on an eight-point pass scale from grade A*, A, B, ... to F, G. The four main decision rules (DRs) we report in this paper are:
1. Proportion of pupils achieving 5 or more GCSEs at grades A*-C, including at least a grade C in both English and maths (threshold DR). This rather crude threshold metric has been used to measure school performance since 1992 (with the inclusion of English and maths restrictions from 2006 onwards).
2. The average grade score for pupils in their best eight subjects at GCSE (unconditional DR). This score converts the grade attained by each pupil in every subject at GCSE and sums across the pupil's best eight subjects. This capped GCSE is not currently reported as a metric in school performance tables, but is used as the outcome measure for 'contextual value added' scores (see below). It is regarded as a broad measure of performance that reflects the overall educational success of the child is less susceptable to gaming than the threshold measure.
3. The average capped GCSE score for pupils at three points in the national ability distribution (differential DR). 4. The contextual value added score for the school, similar to that published for all secondary schools from 2006 (conditional DR). This is essentially a school residual extracted from a multi-level regression that conditions on the pupil and peer characteristics available in NPD (see Ray, 2006) . We calculate our own school CVAtype scores because it was not published by government in 2003.
d. Predicting attainment across a choice set
The most controversial part of the implementation of our method is our approach to predicting a pupil's likely attainment in each school across their choice set. We have 2009 attainment data for this cohort and we combine this contemporaneous data with the 2008 9 Allen and Burgess (2010) has a discussion of the extent to which parents are aware of their child's relative academic performance at the age of 10. We predict pupil capped GCSE achievement for all pupils who have the school in their choice set, provided that there is a reasonably similar pupil at that school. For the main specification we place the constraint that at least 1 percent of pupils at the school must have the same characteristics in terms of: KS2 group (low, middle, high), SEN type, EAL status or ethnicity group. These constraints are controversial to the extent that they restrict the choice set of a pupil to schools attended by somewhat similar pupils, but we clearly face a trade-off between wanting to generate estimates across a relevant choice set and needing to generate estimates that are statistically valid. 10 The distribution of estimates for each coefficient from these school regressions is reported in Appendix Table 3 .
In our main specification that we report in the results section we combine attainment data from the 2008 and 2009 cohorts to estimate the school achievement functions. We do this to achieve more stable estimates on coefficients, particularly for small schools and schools with only a small number of pupils with certain characteristics (we do not allow the effectiveness of a school to vary by pupil type across cohorts). Appendix Table 5 reports several sensitivities to our main specifications in the appendices, including the use of unpooled 2009 data and the inclusion of KS1 attainment variables.
Results
This section reports the extent to which decision rules derived from 2003 English school performance tables are capable of helping parents identify local schools where their child 18 will perform well academically in 2009. We demonstrate the performance of our threshold decision rule and compare its performance to alternative rules. These rules are more successful for some types of children and we explore why this might be through analysis of single subject performance and a decomposition of the stability of measures over time.
a. The performance of the threshold decision rule
We present the results in Table 1 for the 515,985 students with more than one school in their choice set. It shows the chances that this threshold decision rule (DR) identifies a school that turns out to have been a good choice. We benchmark each decision rule against an uninformed choice and compute the odds ratio of making a good choice against a bad choice. In principle we would model an uninformed choice as a choice at random. However, many students face choice sets with just 2 or 3 schools in and in this case, a literal random choice will produce a very high percentage of ties. This makes the statistics hard to interpret because it means the odds of one random choice outperforming another random choice are not 1.0 (we report all statistics relative to a random choice in Appendix Table 4 ). For this reason we compare the outcome of the decision rules with the expected value of a choice at random, namely the mean outcome for each student over all schools in her/his choice set.
We consider how often choosing the best school according to the threshold DR is at least as good as a random choice, how often choosing a good school from the tables is at least as good as random, and whether the school identified by the tables as the worst choice turns out to be worse than random. We define a good school as one chosen at random from the top half of the performance table on that decision rule. Table 1 reports the odds that the threshold DR using 2003 data will produce an outcome that is better than the predicted mean average performance for the pupil across their choice set in 2009. Overall, using this decision rule to select the best school in the choice set correctly identifies a school where the child should outperform the average across their choice set 1.92 times more frequently than it identifies one where the child performs worse.
Clearly this means that a substantial fraction of students would turn out to be badly advised by the performance tables; but the number for whom they proved useful is almost twice as large. Picking a school in the top half identified by the decision rule is at least as good as random 1.35 times more frequently than it is worse. Similarly, avoiding the school identified as the worst is a good idea 1.56 times more often than not.
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The remainder of the table disaggregates this performance of the decision rule by the size of the choice set, by the degree of variation in the choice set and by the students' prior ability.
The performance of this decision rule is notably greater for pupils with high prior attainment in KS2 tests than it is for pupils with low prior attainment. Picking the best school according to the decision rule turns out to be better than random with odds of 2.92 for the top third of KS2 students, compared to the just 1.37 for the bottom third of KS2 students. We return to explore this relationship further later in the section.
The threshold decision rule performs better when the variation between schools (on the 2003 decision rule measure) is greater. This intuitively makes sense because where there are greater differences between schools in 2003, there should be a greater chances that the rank ordering is maintained over time. It is also encouraging as it means a greater success rate when it matters more.
One issue is to consider how to express uncertainty in this model. Clearly, each individual school regression belongs in the normal statistical framework, as do predicted outcomes from those. But our outcome variable, the ratio of the number students that turned out to have made good choices on the basis of the decision rule to the number whose choices turned out to be bad, is based on a complex nonlinear function of the predictions of a number of separate regressions. Analytically computing standard errors for this ratio is beyond the scope of this paper. Comparing each decision rule to a random decision seems a natural alternative way to do this. Bootstrapping the entire process would be an alternative, but involves a number of decisions on the sample draws, for example, whether students should be reallocated to different choice sets of schools. As an alternative route to exploring the robustness of the statistics, we report the sensitivity to alternative specifications in the Appendix.
b. Comparing different decision rules
We now compare the outcome of using the threshold DR to using the unconditional, differential and conditional DRs. We explore some reasons for this in Table 5 .
One surprising finding is that the performance of the differential DR (this is capped GCSE scores at three different points in the ability distribution) is no better than that of the unconditional DR on which it is based. Intuition suggests that the provision of more information should do better; that having information on different parts of the distribution is more useful than just the average. The idea is that a more finely targeted decision on which school might be best would provide better information for students: specifically, students of low or high ability would be directed to schools performing differentially well for such students. 11 However, our results show that this is not true and it actually performs particularly poorly for high ability pupils.
There are several reasons why this might be the case. It may be because schools are not differentially effective in a stable manner over time and we explore this further in Table 5 .
Also, differential effectiveness measures will not be more informative than raw effectiveness if only the size, and not the ranking, of school effects varies within a choice set at different parts of the ability distribution. Within our choice set, schools do indeed have greater variability on the differential DR at the low ability point than the high ability point. However, the Spearman's rank correlation within a choice set using our unconditional DR versus our differential DR at the three ability points is high at an average of around 0.7 for each pairwise comparison. This observation that slopes of differential effectiveness as a function of ability often do not cross has been reported in other papers (e.g. Thomas et al., 1997) . A final advantage of the unconditional DR is that it incorporates information about school composition, whereas scores at different points of the distribution do not. Table 6 explores 11 As discussed in the data section, we assumed that students in the bottom third of the ability distribution would look at the performance measure for them and so on.
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further why the informational benefit of differential DRs is outweighed by the loss of this compositional information.
c. Understanding the heterogeneity in prediction outcomes
The decision rules we have considered yield good ex post predictions for a clear majority of students, but not all. In this section we use the micro data to describe which students the decision rules are not useful for. Table 3 shows the characteristics of pupils for whom we make poor predictions using the threshold DR. We report the average differences in characteristics for these pupils and also the output from a logistic regression of the full set of measured pupil characteristics.
The logistic regression confirms that location factors are important, and that a smaller choice set and low variation of the decision rule within the choice set both make it more likely that the decision rule makes a poor prediction. Our predictions are also poorer for lower ability pupils, for more deprived pupils, for pupils who speak English as an additional language and for pupils of black or Asian ethnicity. However, the overall explanatory power of the model is very low with a pseudo R-squared of just 6.7% (and only 2.5% if we exclude the two location variables), so there is a great deal of randomness in the types of pupils for whom the decision rules make poor predictions.
The poor performance of most decision rules for the lower ability pupils is particularly interesting. This group of pupils have the greatest opportunity to influence their attainment through school choice, according to a variety of metrics. For example, the correlation between a pupil's own KS2 score and the standard deviation in estimated 2009 outcomes in the choice set is -0.26 in this cohort. However, while it clearly appears to matter where lower ability pupils go to school, it does not appear to be possible to use published decision rules to particularly successfully choose a school. This may be because the larger differences in apparent school effectiveness are actually due to larger unobserved pupil characteristics that determine attainment for this low ability group. Alternatively, schools are indeed able to influence attainment a great deal for this group, but do not necessarily do so in a manner that is consistent over time. Related to this, school exam entry policies for this group of pupils are more likely to have radically changed in response to changes in the league table metrics over the past decade. The data presented in Table 5 suggests that the first explanation may be the most important.
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An alternative explanation of the fact that we are doing a poor job of modelling the potential outcomes of low ability pupils in high scoring schools is as follows. It might be that we can only model high performance pupils in high performance schools as it is essentially only that sort of pupil in those schools, and few low ability pupils actually find themselves in such schools. This would be troublesome for our approach, but in fact is plainly not the case.
In our data, pupils from each quartile of the ability distribution can be found, in numbers, in almost every school in our data.
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d. Single subject performance Table 4 presents information on the single subjects of English and maths to further explore why decision rules often perform poorly. The middle column of data reports the extent to which using a school's 2003 average maths GCSE successfully identifies a better than average child's 2009 achievement in maths. The odds of this a very high at 3.03, far higher than for any of the decision rules we have used so far to predict 2009 capped GCSE attainment. The figure for English GCSE is almost as high at 2.79. This is somewhat surprising since we usually find that disaggregated measures are unstable compared to an aggregation of several subjects. Of course we don't know whether this is because there relatively high persistent quality in a school's maths department over a six year period or because there are unobserved time-invariant cohort characteristics that strongly predict maths attainment. Interestingly, maths and English DRs are capable of predicting 2009 capped GCSE attainment almost as well as the unconditional (capped GCSE) DR does. This would be true if maths or English department quality is highly related to long-run school quality. However, the more likely explanation for the relatively poor success of the unconditional DR is that the capped GCSE measure has been subject to considerable changes in the criteria about how GCSE equivalent exams are able to count in the measure.
It has also been argued that schools can manipulate a pupil's performance through introduction of certain GCSE equivalent subjects (West, 2010) Both of these reasons mean that capped GCSE scores have not be as stable over time as we might expect, which reduces the odds of successfully using any decision rules to predict a pupil's performance on this outcome measure. . However, the key issue for a parent in choosing a school, and for our evaluation approach, is just local stability -stability within that parent's choice set; stability at a national level as reported by Leckie and Goldstein (2009) is not relevant to that decision. Also, only instability in metrics that produce changes in ranking are important since, on our performance metrics, it is the rankings of local schools that determine how parents choose schools.
The second reason why a decision rule might only poorly predict a pupil's exam performance is because the value of the metric for even the contemporaneous cohort, ℎ , , is only weakly related to our estimate of any one specific pupil's estimated exam performance at that school, , , . If the within-school variance in performance was low and the between-variance high we would expect the predictions based on some overall school metric to be good; if within-variance is large and between-variance low then we would expect poor predictions. Table 5 decomposes the performance of the decision rules into these two parts. It shows, for example, that the odds that the school with the highest capped GCSE score in 2003 (i.e. our unconditional DR) is still above the average capped GCSE in the choice set in 2009 is extremely high at 16.24. The stability of the all the decision rules that measure some 'raw' performance outcome are very high. By contrast, the stability of the differential and conditional DRs is relatively low within the choice set (odds ratios of 2.51 and 2.00, respectively). This relatively low local stability of CVA is consistent with the low national stability reported by Leckie and Goldstein (2009) .
As a thought experiment, the final column reports how well using a contemporaneous decision rule, i.e. the 2009 data, fares in correctly picking a better than average school.
Clearly parents cannot use future data to choose schools, but for the purposes of the decomposition, this is the natural counterpart to the temporal stability analysis. f. The role of school composition in school choice This is actually almost as high as the performance of the threshold DR, even though it tells parents nothing about the teaching quality and exam performance of the school. School peer groups are very stable indeed over time, but this is offset by the worse predictive power of mean KS2 in contemporaneous 2009 data. So, to the extent that it is predictive at all, the peer composition of a cohort six years prior to your child's is still a useful indicator of a school where your child is likely to do well.
Discussion
There is some scepticism of the value of performance information as a guide to parents choosing schools. This is unfortunate as there is new evidence that exploiting good information can be transformative for disadvantaged students if their parents are given the information at the time they make school choices (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008) . It has been argued that raw outcome 'league tables' mainly reflect school composition rather than teaching quality and so are uninformative of the likely outcome for any particular student. It has also been argued that performance rankings are so unstable that they provide no useful guide to the future (Kane and Staiger, 2002; Leckie and Goldstein, 2009 ). This paper proposes and implements a natural metric which combines all these critiques and estimates 25 the frequency with which parents using ex ante performance information would turn out to have made the right decision ex post.
Our results are surprising: we show that the scepticism is over-stated, and that parents should use performance information to choose schools. Decisions based on the standard performance tables we consider turn out to produce better ex post decisions than uninformed (random) choices. We measure this as an odds ratio: the ratio of ex post betterthan-random decisions to ex post worse-than-random decisions. For a threshold type pass measure (the %5A*-C GCSE measure) the ratio is 1.92; for an unconditional continuous points score measure (capped GCSE measure) it is 2.04, and for a conditional gain measure (the CVA measure) it is 1.33. When most students face around 5 schools in their choice set, this is a good performance.
We show that performance tables are most useful for the students who face a large variability in ex ante school performance within their choice set; where school choice matters most, league tables can be particularly informative. Where school choice matters least because differences in quality are low, league tables are not particularly helpful in predicting a child's future academic performance, so in these circumstances our analysis should encourage parents to choose schools on other important factors, such as provision of after school activities, distance to home or ethos.
On the other hand, the measures are least useful for poor students and low ability students. This is particularly unfortunate because the variation in ex post pupil achievement within a choice set is much higher for lower ability students. This suggests that making a good choice may matter more for these pupils, but performance tables are not as informative for school choice as they are for other groups. That said, using performance tables is still better than choosing a school at random in predicting GCSE achievement.
We decompose the success rate of performance tables into explanatory power in contemporaneous data and stability of the decision rule over time. Another surprise is that the best performance information is only slightly more useful in school choice than a school's composition, measured by the average prior attainment of pupils entering the school. Part of this may simply be that who you sit next to in a classroom matters: it has been shown that peers have a positive effect on achievement growth and, moreover, students throughout the school test score distribution appear to benefit from higher achieving peers (Hanushek et al., 2003) . However, we believe that the main reason that school composition is able to forecast outcomes well is that it strongly influences the long-run sorting of teachers, headteachers, governing bodies, unpaid volunteers, teaching assistants, and other resources. Whilst clearly some high quality teachers and headteachers spend time in challenging schools, many of them may not stay there very long (Lankford et al., 2002; Dolton and Newsom, 2003; Rivkin et al., 2005) . High teacher turnover is particularly a problem for urban schools if they are forced to replace experienced exiting teachers with new recruits to the profession who will take a few years to reach their highest productivity (Rivkin et al., 2005) . To be clear, our argument is not that school composition is all that matters directly and teaching quality not at all; rather, we argue that teaching quality matters a great deal, but that averaged over a number of years, this is strongly influenced by school composition. This is not a comfortable conclusion. It implies that it is not rational for a middle class parent to pick a deprived school, even if it is doing well now (unless there is clear hope of a long-run improving trend in peer quality). For this reason, use of raw attainment metrics may entrench existing social segregation between schools. It also provides an incentive for schools to cream-skim the pupils who are more able or easier to teach (Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996; Ladd and Walsh, 2000) . Furthermore, if raw attainment metrics are not carefully devised their continued use may lead to teaching to the test and curriculum distortion (Goldstein 2001; Klein et al., 2000 , Jacob, 2005 , Reback, 2008 .
However, the conclusion regarding the relationship between school composition and longrun school quality is only a function of the current system of resource allocation. It derives from the fact that policies to improve school quality for disadvantaged pupils are very difficult. Policies need to either work harder to equalise school intakes, perhaps through ballots for over-subscribed schools, or enable deprived schools to attract superior resources, through increased funding for disadvantaged pupils and deregulation of teacher pay.
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The message of this paper can also be seen as a positive one. We show that provision of performance data is useful to parents, and Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that it will be used by parents and can be transformative to the educational outcomes for disadvantaged students. The obvious policy reform would be to mandate local authorities to publish exam performance data alongside admissions information in the school admissions brochures sent to parents of 10 year-old children. This should improve the chances that more disadvantaged families use this performance information, and will make no difference to the choices of advantaged families who already incorporate this information into their decisions. In this sense it should improve equality of opportunity for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. However, greater use of performance information by poor families cannot be transformative without reforms to the school admissions system so that students from these disadvantaged families can actually access the schools that they might choose on the basis of the performance data. 13 In the UK, Chowdry et al. (2008) show that local authorities allocate only half of these extra resources for deprivation to the schools that those children actually attend. 
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